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In the Matter of the Arbitration between
Utility Workers Union of America, AFL-CIO,
Brotherhood of Utility Workers Council, Local
Unions Nos. 310, 317, 322, 329 and 330

Award
of
Arbitrators

and
Massachusetts Electric Company and
Narragansett Electric Company
The Undersigned Arbitrators, having been designated in accordance with the Arbitration
Agreements entered into by the above-named Parties, and dated May 12, 1999, and having duly
heard the proofs and allegations of the Parties, Award as follows:
The Companies did not violate the Agreements dated May 12, 1999
by not paying line crews assigned to provide emergency storm
assistance to Niagra Mohawk Company during the ice storm of
February, 2002, the prevailing rates of pay of the Niagra Mohawk
line employees.

Eric J. S<5nmertz
Chairman of Board of Arbitration

j^-f

y

"

.

fr L/\~'

Thomas M. Hession /
Company Member of Board of Arbitration
Concurring

George B. Fogarty '-I
Union Member of Board b'f Arbitration
Dissenting
Dated: September 13, 2002
State of New York
County of New York
On this \$'^ day of September, 2002, before me personally came and appeared Eric J.
Schmertz to me known and known to me to be the individual described in and who executed the
foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.
'M.

Notary Public
My Commission expires: /^ J?/'t? 2

Dated: September D ,2002
State of _
County _
On this

*1 day of September, 2002, before me personally came and appeared Thomas
M. Hession to me known and known to me to be the individual described in and who executed
the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

ALDO BARRESI
Notary Public
Commonwealth of Massachusetts
My Commission Expires
November 14, 2008

Notary Public
My Commission expires: / y /

Dated: September 9,2002
State o
County
,,-^fi
On this
day of September, 2002, before me personally came and appeared George
P. Fogarty to me known and known to me to be the individual described in and who executed the
foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

Notary Public
My Commission expires:

National Grid
National Grid USA Service Company, Inc.

September 12, 2002

Eric J. Schmertz, Esq.
c/o Dweck Law Firm
230 Park Avenue, Suite 416
New York, NY 10169
Re:

National Grid companies and
BUW Council/UWUA, AFL-CIO, Locals 310, 317, 322, 329 and 330
Storm Assignment Payments (NY storm assignments)

Dear Mr. Schmertz:
Enclosed are three signed awards from the above-referenced arbitration. Once you have
signed these copies, would you please return Tom Hession's copy to my attention, one
copy to George Fogarty and keep the remaining copy for your files.
Sincerely,

Raymond L. Reyes
l~>
Director of Labor Relations

Enc.

25 Research Drive
Westborough, MA 01582-0099
508.389.2000

In the Matter of the Arbitration between
Utility Workers Union of America, AFL-CIO,
Brotherhood of Utility Workers Council, Local
Unions Nos. 310, 317, 322, 329 and 330

Award
of
Arbitrators

and
Massachusetts Electric Company and
Narragansett Electric Company
The Undersigned Arbitrators, having been designated in accordance with the Arbitration
Agreements entered into by the above-named Parties, and dated May 12, 1999, and having duly
heard the proofs and allegations of the Parties, Award as follows:
The Companies did not violate the Agreements dated May 12, 1999
by not paying line crews assigned to provide emergency storm
assistance to Niagra Mohawk Company during the ice storm of
February, 2002, the prevailing rates of pay of the Niagra Mohawk
line employees.

Eric J. Schmertz
Chairman of Board of Arbitration

Thomas M. Hession /
Company Member of Board of Arbitration
Concurring

George P./Fogarty
Union Member of Board of Arbitration
Dissenting
Dated: September , 2002
State of New York
County of New York
On this
day of September, 2002, before me personally came and appeared Eric J.
Schmertz to me known and known to me to be the individual described in and who executed the
foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.
Notary Public
My Commission expires:

Dated: September 5 ,2002
State of ' AM-5-5"
_
County M
On this _5_ ^ day of September, 2002, before me personally came and appeared Thomas
M. Hession to me known and known to me to be the individual described in and who executed
the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.
ALDO BARRESI
Notary Public
Commonwealth of Massachusetts
My Commission Expires
November 14, 2008

Notary Public
My Commission expires:

Dated: September ^,2002
State of
County
On this V day of September, 2002, before me personally came and appeared George
P. Fogarty to me known and known to me to be the individual described in and who executed the
foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

y
Notary Public
My Commission expires:

-X
IN THE MATTER OF THE ARBITRATION
between
OPINION AND AWARD
LOCAL 169, UNION OF NEEDLE TRADES,
INDUSTRIAL AND TEXTILE EMPLOYEES
AFL-CIO
-andPEARL PAINT COMPANY INC.
-X

The issue in dispute between the above-named Union and
Company involves the application and interpretation of Section
14.3 of the collective bargaining agreement.

That Section reads:

14.3 Upon
the
execution
of
this
Agreement, all employees who have
completed their probationary period
shall receive a wage increase of at
least fifty ($0.50) cents per hour
or a minimum wage rate of $8.50,
whichever is greater. All employees
whose annual review or new hire-oO
day review should have occurred
between November 29, 2001 and the
date of execution of this Agreement
and who did not receive an increase
during such period shall receive
the increase provided for herein
retroactive to the date that such
employee should have received an
increase.
By mutual
parties

submitted

agreement,
their

affidavits, and exhibits.

no hearing

respective

cases

was
to

held, but the
me

by

briefs,

It

is

undisputed

that

prior

to

unionization,

the

Company's practice was to conduct wage reviews for its employees
on

the

90th

day

after

hire

of

new

employees

anniversary dates of hire for others.

and

on

the

Based on those reviews,

the Company decided if wage increases would be granted.
The

Union

began

an

organizational

campaign

in

August 2001; filed a petition seeking certification with the NLRB
on

October

29,

2001;

and

following

a

NLRB

November 29, 2001 was certified as the bargaining
unit

employees.

The parties

commenced

election

on

agent of the

collective bargaining

negotiations on April 1, 2002 and reached agreement on a contract
effective

June

2,

2002.

Section

14.3, as

recited

above was

included in that contract.
It is universally well settled that the arbitrator is
bound by the contract.
clear

and unambiguous,

And if the relevant contract term is
it pre-empts

assertions

of

equity

or

fairness that may be contrary.
I conclude that that is what is present in this case.
The

Union's

case

is

based

on

equity

and

fairness

and

the

Company's on the contract language.
Between the NLRB ordered election and the conclusion
of negotiations,

the periodic wage reviews were "frozen" and no

wage increases were granted.

Therefore, new hires who had completed

their 90th day and others who reached the anniversaries of their hires,

were not reviewed

and not granted wage increases.

Apparently

several employees fell into that category.
It is the Union's assertion that had the Union not
engaged

in

a

successful

organizational

language,

all

employees would have been reviewed and granted wage

those

increases.

And not to do so under Section 14.3 of the contract is unfair,
inequitable and violative of that Section's intent.

The Union

interprets Section 14.3, and particularly the part that refers to
reviews

that

"should

have

occurred..."

as

applying

to

those

employees who were denied reviews and wage increases during the
"freeze" of wage reviews, including those whose regular reviews
would have preceded November 29, 2001.
As equitable
with the
freeze

arguable

before

as the Union's interpretations

"unfairness"

November

29th,

to those
I

do

may be,

employees caught

not

find

Section

the
14.3

susceptible to the Union's interpretation.
First, I must conclude that Section 14.3 is clear and
unambiguous.

It specifically specifies a time period or "cut-

off" period for the granting of wage increases.
replaces

the

Company's

prior

unilateral

Clearly, it

practice

negotiated, collective bargained wage provision.

with

a

I
A

reading

interpretation.

of

Section

14.3

compels

only

one

Applicable to this case, it provides for wage

increases in lieu of the old wage reviews for employees:
"Whose annual review or new hire-90 day
review should have occurred
between,
November 29, 2001 and the date of the
execution of the Agreement..." (emphasis
added)
Clearly the parties picked and negotiated a specific
date

and

specific

period

to apply

to those who

did not get

reviews, namely the period beginning November 29, 2001 and ending
with

the

contract

execution.

The Union's

interpretation

of

"review(s) (that) should have occurred..." fails to account for
the

rest

November
precludes

of

that

29, 2001.

sentence
A

full

any application

which
reading

sets

a

start

date

of that initial

of

sentence

to those employees who did not get

reviews prior to November 29, 2001, even if but for the "freeze,"
they would have been scheduled for such reviews.
If

Section

14.3

produced

inequitable

or

unfair

consequences for some employees who may have been passed over for
wage increase considerations while others whose review dates fell
after November 29th received increases, it is a reflection of the
bargain reached by the parties in negotiations, and it is to that
bargain that the arbitrator is bound.

No matter why the parties picked November 29th as the
start date, in my view they knew or should have known that some
employees fell into a group that would have been reviewed prior
to November 29th.

Yet, for reasons known or best known to the

negotiators, November 29th was agreed to.

Clearly they could

have included a date or language which would have covered those
scheduled for reviews earlier.

But they did not.

The arbitrator

cannot make a clear contract provision more retroactive than did
the parties themselves.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and
having duly considered the proofs and allegations of the abovenamed parties, makes the following AWARD:
The Company did not violate Section 14.3 of
the collective bargaining agreement by not
granting retroactive wage increases to those
employees whose wage reviews would have
occurred prior to November 29, 2001.

Eric J. Schmertz, Arbitrator

DATED:

October 4, 2002

STATE OF NEW YORK

)
ss:

COUNTY OF NEW YORK

)

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed
this instrument, which is my AWARD.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION
ADMINISTRATOR

ASSOCIATION,
-X

IN THE MATTER OF THE ARBITRATION

between
OPINION AND AWARD
UNITED PUBLIC SERVICE EMPLOYEES UNION

Case #133900097002
-and-

SACHEM CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT
-X

The parties were not able to stipulate a jointly agreed
to issue.
The Union stated the issue as:
Did the District violate its agreements with
the Union when it penalized employees for a
negotiated productivity gain (15 minutes/180
work days) by reducing overtime rates of pay
throughout the 260 days work year.
If so,
what shall be the remedy?
The District sees the issue as:
Did the District
violate the collective
bargaining
agreement
by calculating
unit
employees' regular rate of pay by dividing
twelve-month employees' daily rate of pay by
seven point seven five and attendance aides'
daily rate of pay by seven point two five in
lieu
of
seven
point
five
and
seven
respectively. If so, what
shall be the
remedy?
A

hearing

District offices,

was

held

on

September

19,

at which time representatives

named Union and District appeared.

2002
of the

at

the

above-

All concerned were afforded

full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine

and cross-examine witnesses.

A stenographic record was taken.

The Arbitrator's Oath was waived.

The parties filed post-hearing

briefs.
It

is

clear

to

me

that

the

dispute

involves

the

methodology of calculating the hourly rate of pay for over-time
work.
And
narrowed

it

is

further

clear

to

me

that

the

issue

is

to the meaning and intent of the proposal of mediator

Karen R. Kenney regarding a 15 minute extension of the regular
work day as the quid pro quo for an annualized salary increase
for regular work time.
The
interpreting
agreement

authority
and

that

of

applying
the

an

terms

parties

Arbitrator
of
have

a

is

limited

to

collective bargaining
negotiated

when

the

interpretation or application is in dispute.
The

Arbitrator's

authority

does

not

extend

to

the

legislation of terms of conditions which have been omitted from
the contract because there was no bargaining on such conditions
of employment or where, because of a "mutual mistake" there was
no meeting of the minds.

Indeed the arbitration clause of this

contract expressly so limits the Arbitrator.
Here,

in my view,

the dispute is not over

contract

language or terms negotiated by the parties, but rather over a

mediator's proposal which the parties accepted and incorporated
in and as part of their contract by the Memorandum of Agreement
of

October

1, 2001,

subject

to

the

preparation

of

a

formal

agreement which was not completed because of their dispute.
More

specifically,

the

question

is - whether

the

mediators' proposal that:
"Effective January 1, 2002 unit employees
will have their work day extended by fifteen
(15) minutes on days in which teachers are in
attendance;"
had an effect on and was intended to apply to overtime work.
The Union contends that the mediator's proposal was, as
it states, limited to the regular work day and though it called
for

15 additional minutes of work

salary

(including

a

wage

for

increase)

it

the
did

otherwise
not

regular

change

the

calculation of an hourly rate for overtime work.

In short, the

Union

overtime

asserts

that

the

formula

for

the

hourly

rate

should not include the extra 15 minutes of the regular work day.
For to do so is to reduce the overtime hourly rate and reduce the
unit employees overtime pay accordingly.
The
differently.

District
It

interprets

contends

that

the
is

mediator's
has

not

proposal

changed

the

mathematical formula for calculating an hourly rate for overtime.
Rather,

it

mathematical
hours

asserts

that

it

has

continued

to

use

the

same

formula, namely to divide the regular pay by the

regularly

worked,

but including the extra 15 minutes,
3

in calculating an hourly rate of pay.
that hourly rate for overtime pay.

And then, as before, used

It argues that the mediator's

proposal for a 15 minute extension of the regular work day, as a
productivity gain for a wage increase, makes compellingly logical
that the hourly rate of pay for regular work would be adjusted
downward and that accordingly the application of that adjusted
hourly rate is properly applicable to payment for overtime work.
The record before me indicates that with the acceptance
by the parties of various proposals by the mediator including
inter alia the foregoing regular work day extension and certain
specified wage increases, the parties did not bargain on, discuss
or

apparently

even

consider

the

effect

or

non-effect

regular work day extension on the hourly overtime rate.

of

the

And the

contract contains no provision on how the overtime rates are to
be fixed.
That being so, I conclude that the instant dispute not
only

does

not

involve

the

application

or

interpretation

of

contract terms negotiated by the parties, but is not as yet a
justiciable

issue.

Yet,

as a "wage" matter

it is mandatory

subject of collective bargaining.
As I see it, either position advanced respectively by
the Union and the District is plausible and supportable.

It is

quite possible that the mediator intended to extend the regular
work

day

by

15 minutes,

but

did

not

intend

to

extend

that

productivity factor to the calculation of the over-time rate, or
put another way, the over-time calculation was to remain as
before,

without the inclusion of the extra 15 minutes in the

calculation.

There is logic to this view inasmuch as the hourly

rate

for the regular work

of pay

day is not operational

but

rather theoretical because regular pay rates are based on annual
salaries set forth in Appendix A of the contract.
But it is also, possible, in support of the District's
position,

that the consistent

past practice of calculating

the

over-time hourly rate by using the length of the regular work day
divided into weekly salary must perforce now include the extended
regular work day by 15 minutes.

That, asserts the District is a

continuation of the unvaried past practice of fixing an hourly
rate for overtime.

And that as a "productivity gain" for a wage

increase to disregard the extra 15 minutes in fixing the hourly
rate for overtime would be to deprive the District of some of
that "gain" and not give it full credit for the wage increase.
In my view
language,

to pick

and in the absence

either

position

would

of specific
not

be

to

contract
apply

or

interpret the contract but rather to legislate what I thought the
mediator meant and intended.

What is needed here in my judgment

is a clarification by the mediator of whether her proposals on
the work day and wages had an effect on the calculation
over-time hourly rate.

of the

And failing any such clarification one

way or the other, the issue does not become a justiciable dispute
until the parties have unsuccessfully bargained on it, or have
first attempted to achieve a "meeting of the minds."
Nor
determined

am

by

I

persuaded

the preamble

that

of the

this

matter

contract

is

which

otherwise
inter

alia

provides:
"All terms and conditions of employment
covered by this agreement shall continue
be subject to the District's direction
control and shall not be the subject
negotiation
until
the
commencement
negotiation for a successor agreement..."

not
to
and
of
of

The instant dispute centers, in part at least, not on a
term and condition not covered by the agreement, but rather on a
disagreement

on

what

term

and

condition

not

contract obtains in making that calculation.

covered

by

the

Put another way

either the District's view or the Union's view, albeit materially
different, may

be

contract.

determination

A

the

term

invocation of the preamble.

and
of

condition not
which

is

covered

first

by the

needed

for

Also, as the dispute arose out of

the negotiations for the successor contract, and as that dispute
has precluded the finalization of the critical language of the
successor

contract,

an exception

to the District's

managerial

authority is present.
What

is needed

for a correct

interpretation

of the

meaning and intent of the mediator's work day and wage proposals
is

a clarification

by

mediator Karen R. Kenney. Only she, not
6

Arbitrator can tell what was meant, and whether her
relate to calculating overtime hourly rates.

proposals

Indeed, applying

the "best evidence" rule, a classification by the mediator is the
"best evidence" and certainly better than a legislated answer by
the Arbitrator.
clarification

My Award shall direct the parties
and

shall

provide

a

subsequent

to seek a
method

for

resolution of the dispute if necessary.
The Undersigned duly designated as the Arbitrator, and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above-named
parties, makes the following AWARD:
The parties shall jointly seek a
clarification from mediator Karen R.
Kenney regarding
the meaning and
intent of her proposals on the length
of the work day and wages on the
calculation of the hourly rate of pay
for overtime work by unit employees.
A clarification by Ms. Kenney that is
responsive to the dispute shall be
final and binding.
If Ms. Kenney
declines to provide a clarification
or if her clarification does not
resolve
the
dispute
one way
or
another, the parties are directed to
negotiate
on
the
matter,
having
apparently not done so in their
bargaining
or
in
the
mediation
process.
If they fail to agree then
it becomes a justiciable issue.

Having selected arbitration for the
instant case, they shall use the
arbitration forum for resolution in
that event.

Eric J.xgchmertz, Arbitrator

DATED:

December 11, 2002

STATE OF NEW YORK

ss:
:OUNTY OF NEW YORK
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed
this instrument, which is my AWARD.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION,
ADMINISTRATOR
-X

IN THE MATTER OF THE ARBITRATION
between
OPINION AND AWARD
UNITED FOOD and COMMERCIAL WORKERS
LOCAL 371, AFL-CIO

CASE #13300000811

-andSHAWS HOSPITAL
-X

The stipulated issue is:
Did the Company have proper cause for the
discharge of RAYMOND ACCARDO?
If so, what
shall be the remedy?
Hearings were held in Hartford, Connecticut on December
27,

2001

and

February

1,

2002

at

which

time

Mr.

Accords,

hereinafter referred to as the "grievant" and representatives of
the above-named Union and Employer appeared.

All concerned were

afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to
examine and cross-examine witnesses.

Each side filed a post-

hearing brief.
The grievant, a meat cutter with about seven years of
service was discharged for violating the following position of
the Associate Purchase Policy:
"You may purchase reduced merchandise only
after it has been put on display for our
customers.
Reduced merchandise may not be
set aside for purchase later in the workday.

Violation of this guideline may result
immediate termination of employment."

in

The Union does not challenge the Employer's right to
promulgate

that

Policy

nor

its

general

purpose.

Rather,

it

asserts that the grievant did not violate it, either in letter or
in spirit.

And that in any event, discharge

is also without

cause because the grievant did not improperly benefit from the
transaction nor did the Company suffer any monetary loss.
As

to the facts, the grievant took possession of a

basket of cheese which had been reduced in price to $1 an item
and destined for sale in a specific display location for products
so

reduced

in price.

Such

display,

for

sale

to the

general

public, is the customary and prescribed procedure prior to the
point when the product would go "out of code" and be required to
be discarded.
The evidence is clear and undisputed that the grievant
took possession of the basket of cheese before it was placed in
the particular sale location for reduced sale to the public.
It is disputed how and exactly when he took possession,
but in any event it was before it would have been physically
available to and offered to the general public.
It is undisputed that the grievant properly knew that
the cheese was to be reduced in price (or potentially so reduced)
and

told

the

assistant

deli manager
2

Christy

Sorrentino

to

the effect that "if it was reduced in price, he'd take it off her
hands."

He is not charged with any participation in or improper

complicity in the decision to reduce the price.
The Employer claims that the grievant took possession
of the cheese by retrieving it from the back room of the deli
department
Employer

when it was located on a counter

reasons

particular

top.

(Though the

that it was "being held" for him there, that

charge

was

not

advanced

on

an

evidentiary

basis

against the grievant in this case).
The grievant and the Union on his behalf assert that
the

grievant

got the

basket

of

cheese

in

a

"hand-off"

from

Sorrentino in the corridor leading out of the deli location, as
she was on her way to place it in the floor display area for
reduced sale to the public.
On this fact, the Union

argues that the intent and

provisions of the Policy had been met —
had been reduced

namely that the product

in price by Sorrentino

and effectively

least constructively available for reduced sale.

or at

And, as it was

"on its way" to the reduced display area, the grievant had the
right to buy it, as a legitimate customer.

The Union argues that

it is immaterial that the product did not actually arrive at the
special sales location, and that as long as the grievant paid the
reduced

price,

he

was

not

benefited,

the

Employer

received

monetarily

what it would

have received

at and

from

the sale

display location and that the grievant'3 discharge is based on a
overly technical distinction of no substantive value.
Indeed,
hypothesizes
sale

support

of

that had the grievant

location,

immediately

in

he

upon

could

its

have

placement

this

argument

followed

properly
therein,

the

Sorrentino
taken

paid

the

for

Union
to the
product

it

at

the

register and no violation whatsoever would have been charged.
The

Union

sees

no

difference,

or

at

least

no

disciplinary distinction between what it claims happened and the
latter scenario.1
Provided

the

Employer's

Policy

is

reasonable,

adequately job related and even handedly administered, I find
that the Policy is enforceable specifically.

And

if so, the

different versions of how the grievant got the product would be
immaterial.
reduced

For the uncontested fact is that it never got to the

sale

location

for

display

and

thereby

never

made

available or effectively offered to the public for reduced sale.
Either way,

the grievant

took possession

before the

public had a chance to know it was on sale and to buy it.

That

being so, I reject the Union's contention that the grievant had
acquired "public" or "customer" status.

]As

And it is not material

this hypothetical is not factually before me, I make no
determination on that circumstance.

if, as the grievant

claims, he was "off the clock"

then. In

short, his "interception" of the normal and prescribed transfer
of

the cheese

counter was

from

the deli department

not only premature but

to the

frustrated

floor

display

the Employer's

policy to offer the product first to the general public.
Whether

any

such

"interception"

should

be

a

disciplinary offense turns on the reasonableness and propriety of
the Policy and its implementation.
I find the Associate Purchase Policy to be reasonable
and properly

job related. The Employer

is a supermarket.

mission is to make available and sell food products
items)

to the general public.

procedurally

in

other

Obviously,

sections

of

the

(and other

except as set
Policy,

Its

there

forth
is

no

priority of the right to buy between the public and employees at
regular prices.

But, for goods near the point of "going out of

code" and to be sold at a reduced price, the general buying
public
priority

enjoys,
over

unreasonable.

specifically
employees.

I

under
cannot

the

Policy,

find

this

a

first

priority

offer
to

be

If the Employer wishes to give preference to the

general customers,

that is a managerial prerogative consistent

with its public business and the Union has no present

contractual

right to challenge that priority or its wisdom. Nor therefore are
the matters

of non-financial

benefit

to the employee

or non-

financial loss to the Employer exceptions to enforcement of the
Policy.
Also, though there is no such charge in this case, the
Policy has the legitimate objective of preventing employees from
"rigging" price reductions and setting the product aside for the
purpose of buying it at the reduced price, before any offer can
be made to the general public.

Thereby effectuating a definite

and improper benefit for the employer(s) involved, at the expense
of denying

the general public

the opportunity

to buy

at the

reduced price.2
For

these adequate reasons, the

Policy

is

strictly

enforceable,

requires full application, and may not be

"short-

circuited."

The Union's argument of "compliance" with the spirit

and purpose of the Policy falters on this point, because the
grievant got possession of the cheese short of full application
and implementation of the Policy.
The

remaining

question

is whether

discharge

is

the

penalty that should have been imposed in this case, or whether
contractually,

progressive discipline of

a

lesser penalty

is

first required.
I
discipline
contrast

reject
is

the

required

provisions

or

Union's
before
Policy

argument

summary

that

progressive

dismissal.

statements

preempt

Specific
general

6

The Employer submitted evidence of some practices and cases of
this tvoe of abuse.

2

language.

Here the penalty of "termination" is specified as a

penalty for violations of the Policy.

That specific condition

trumps

the

the

"progressive
violation of

general

statement

discipline."
the

Policy

that

It meansr

Employer

of course

the Employer

discipline but is not required to do so.

may

that

utilize
for this

utilize progressive

Rather, it may also, at

its discretion, impose termination for the first offense.

That

too, for the reasons stated, cannot be judged unreasonable, nor
may

the Arbitrator

or

the

Union

substitute

their

judgements

otherwise.
However, it is universally well settled that employees
similarly situated, who commit similar or related offenses, must
be penalized even handedly, if not equally.

Here, it is apparent

that the Employer determined that Sorrentino also violated the
Policy, by playing some role in the arrangement that permitted
the grievant to get the basket of cheese.

I need not determine

precisely her role because she was disciplined for what she did,
and that discipline, a one-day suspension, is unrebutted evidence
of her misconduct in the transaction for which the grievant was
discharged.

(So far as this record is concerned, that penalty

and its relation to the transaction has not been challenged or
overturned).

To my

mind,

for the

grievant

to be

violation of the Policy and for Sorrentino

discharged

for

to be suspended one

day for violating the Policy is too wide a discrepancy and too
disparate to meet the test of evenhandedness.

If, the grievant

more culpable than Sorrentino, then in my view evenhandedness
requires

a

penalty

proportionate

to

their

respective

roles.

Especially so when both violated the Policy and "termination" is
a specifically mandated penalty.
On that basis, the grievant's discharge is too severe a
penalty when juxtaposed against Sorrentino's one-day

suspension.

Particularly so also when there is no charge against the grievant
of "rigging the price" or "reserving the product."
The Employer cites a line of arbitration cases in which
discharge

was

including

cases

insignificant

uniformly upheld
where

value.

the

for violations

product

was

of

of the
minimum

Policy,
or

But for the disparate penalties

even

in this

case between the grievant and Sorrentino, a fact not present in
the cases cited, I might well have accepted those decisions as
persuasive precedent.

But this case, I find, is distinguishable

from those cited.
For

this

particular

reason,

I

shall

set

aside

grievant's discharge and shall direct his reinstatement.

the

The
determination

parties

have

stipulated

that

with

I am not to yet determine what other penalty or

remedy should be applied to the grievant.

So I shall leave the

question of penalty/remedy to the parties to negotiate.
request

that

of the parties

I shall

retain

At the

jurisdiction to decide

remedy/penalty if the parties fail to reach agreement.
The Undersigned, duly sworn and having duly heard the
proofs

and

allegations

of

the above-named parties, makes the

following AWARD:

The discharge of RAYMOND ACCARDO is reversed.
He shall be reinstated.
The
parties
shall
negotiate
remedy/penalty to be applied to ACCARDO.

the

The Arbitrator shall retain jurisdiction to
make these determinations if the parties are
unable to do so.

Eric J/Schmertz, Arbitrator

DATED:

March 29, 2002

STATE OF NEW YORK

)

COUNTY OF NEW YORK

)

ss:

Ir Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed
this instrument, which is my AWARD.^_^

1>M^
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IMPARTIAL CHAIRMAN LOCAL 100 TRANSPORT
WORKERS UNION AND WHITE PLAINS BUS CO. INC.
y

IN THE MATTER OF THE ARBITRATION

between
OPINION AND AWARD
LOCAL 100, TRANSPORT WORKERS UNION
OF AMERICA
-and-

WHITE PLAINS BUS CO. INC.

The stipulated issue is:
Was there just cause for the discharges of
CHARLENE PHILLIP and LUCILLE CARVER? If not,
what shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held on June 17, 2002, at the offices of
the

Company

at

which

time

Mrs.

Phillip

and

Mrs.

Carver,

hereinafter referred to as the "grievants" appeared, together with
representatives of the above-named Union and Company.
All concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer
evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
The Arbitrator's Oath was waived.
Mrs. Phillip is a driver of a van.
monitor on that van.

Mrs. Carver is the

They have worked together on the same van or

assignment for about a year.

On the day of the incident leading to their discharge
they were transporting a small group of pre-school children to a
pre-school program at the Greenburgh District #7 School.

They

left a three-year-old boy on the van when the other children were
dropped off.

They then parked the van in the School parking lot

and left it unattended.
van

but

discovered

The three-year-old boy was left in the

after

about

employees at that location.

15 minutes

by

other

Company

He was then transported directly to

the pre-school program location.
It is clear and expressly

stated in Company policy,

known I am persuaded by the grievants, that both the driver and
the monitor are responsible for the safe and proper transport of
children in their care, and that both knew or should have known of
the Company's well-publicized

and absolute

policy

requiring

a

careful check of buses and vans to ensure that no child is left
unattended.

And

that the policy is and has been enforced by

penalty of discharge rigidly and without exception, even as with
the grievants, when an employee's prior record is unblemished.
The grievants do not dispute the fact that they left the
three-year-old boy on the van when they left it parked in the
School's parking lot.
the monitor,

had

Phillip erroneously thought that Carver, as

checked all seats and believed that all the

children had been properly

disembarked at the School.
procedure
Phillip

Also, erroneous was their agreed to

to leave the checking of the children to Carver, while
watched

out

for

traffic.

The

unquestionably gives responsibility to both.
Phillip was derelict.
left on the van.

Company

policy,

So in that respect

Of course, the child was not purposefully

But I conclude that Carver checked inadequately,

if not negligently and Phillip failed to do so at all.

So both

grievants are equally culpable and responsible.
In

prior

decisions

I

have

upheld

as

proper,

the

Company's absolute policy to discharge employees who, regardless
of reason and explanation, leave children on a bus/van unattended.
I held in the FRANK BENEDETTO

and ETTA DANIELS

cases that a

failure to follow the Company's explicit and clearly relevant
policy was a breach of the employees' "fiduciary" duty of care for
the children they transport.
Substantively, I find no significant difference in the
seriousness of the instant offense from the failures of Benedetto
and Daniels.

In all three cases a young child (here the youngest

at three years of age) was left precariously

unattended.

The

potential

and damages

were

for the most

present in each case.

serious

consequences

Accordingly, I have no choice but to follow my prior
decisions and uphold the absolute application of the Company's
policy,

as

properly

promulgated

and

wholly

relevant,

indeed

essential to the Company's mission and business.
Similarly, as with Daniels specifically and Benedetto by
observation, I make the same recommendation in the instant case.
The mitigating circumstances with the grievants are significantly
similar to those with Benedetto and Daniels.
remorseful

about

what

happened

and

apologize.

excuses for their lapse in attention.
both

have

had

unblemished

prior

Both grievants are
Both make

no

Both concede the facts and

records.

Indeed

the

Company

unhesitatingly characterizes them as otherwise good employees.
Therefore, with the Company's policy sustained and the
discharges upheld, I recommend that the Company give the girevants
a "last chance."

I recommend they be restored to duty without

back pay, and assigned to driver and monitor work if and as it
becomes

available in areas and

at school districts apart and

different from Greensburgh District &7.1

1 They cannot be restored to Greenburgh under any circumstance
because that District has "decertified" them.

The Undersigned, Impartial Chairman under the collective
bargaining agreement between the above-named parties, and having
duly heard the proofs and allegations of said parties, makes the
following AWARD:
There was just cause for the discharges of
CHARLENE PHILLIP and LUCILLE CARVER.

Eric /T.Schmertz
Impartial Chairman
DATED:

June 24, 2002

STATE OF NEW YORK

)

COUNTY OF NEW YORK

)

ss:

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Impartial Chairman that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

IMPARTIAL CHAIRMAN LOCAL 100 TRANSPORT
WORKERS UNION AND WHITE PLAINS BUS CO. INC.

IN THE MATTER OF THE ARBITRATION
between
OPINION AND AWARD
OCAL 100, TRANSPORT WORKERS UNION
OF AMERICA
-andtfHITE PLAINS BUS CO. INC.
-X

The stipulated issue is:
Was there just cause for the discharges of
CHARLENE PHILLIP and LUCILLE CARVER? If not,
what shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held on June 17, 2002, at the offices of
the

Company

at

which

time

Mrs.

Phillip

and

Mrs.

Carver,

hereinafter referred to as the "grievants" appeared, together with
representatives of the above-named Union and Company.
All concerned were afforded full opportunity

to offer

evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
The Arbitrator's Oath was waived.
Mrs. Phillip is a driver of a van.
monitor on that van.

Mrs. Carver is the

They have worked together on the same van or

assignment for about a year.

On the day of the incident leading to their discharge
they were transporting a small group of pre-school children to a
pre-school program at the Greenburgh District #7 School.

They

left a three-year-old boy on the van when the other children were
dropped off.

They then parked the van in the School parking lot

and left it unattended.
van

but

discovered

The three-year-old boy was left in the

after

employees at that location.

about

15

minutes

by

other

Company

He was then transported directly to

the pre-school program location.
It is clear and expressly

stated in Company

policy,

known I am persuaded by the grlevants, that both the driver and
the monitor are responsible for the safe and proper transport of
children in their care, and that both knew or should have known of
the

Company's

well-publicized

and

absolute policy

requiring a

careful check of buses and vans to ensure that no child is left
unattended.

And

that the policy is and has been enforced by

penalty of discharge rigidly and without exception, even as with
the grievants, when an employee's prior record is unblemished.
The grievants do not dispute the fact that they left the
three-year-old boy on the van when they left it parked in the
School's parking lot.
the monitor, had

Phillip erroneously thought that Carver, as

checked

children had been properly

all seats and believed

that

all the

disembarked at the School.
procedure
Phillip

Also, erroneous was their agreed to

to leave the checking of the children to Carver, while
watched

out

for

traffic.

The

unquestionably gives responsibility to both.
Phillip was derelict.
left on the van.

Company

policy,

So in that respect

Of course, the child was not purposefully

But I conclude that Carver checked inadequately,

if not negligently and Phillip failed to do so at all.

So both

grievants are equally culpable and responsible.
In

prior

decisions

I

have

upheld

as

proper,

Company's absolute policy to discharge employees who,

the

regardless

of reason and explanation, leave children on a bus/van unattended.
I held

in the FRANK BENEDETTO

failure

to

follow

the

Company's

and ETTA DANIELS
explicit

cases that a

and clearly

relevant

policy was a breach of the employees' "fiduciary" duty of care for
the children they transport.
Substantively, I find no significant difference in the
seriousness of the instant offense from the failures of Benedetto
and Daniels.

In all three cases a young child (here the youngest

at three years
potential

for

of age) was left precariously unattended.
the most

present in each case.

serious

consequences and

The

damages were

Accordingly,
decisions
policy,

and uphold
as

properly

I have no choice but to follow my prior
the absolute application of the Company's
promulgated

and

wholly

relevant,

indeed

essential to the Company's mission and business.
Similarly, as with Daniels specifically and Benedetto by
observation, I make the same recommendation in the instant case.
The mitigating circumstances with the grievants are significantly
similar to those with Benedetto and Daniels.
remorseful

about

what

happened

and

apologize.

excuses for their lapse in attention.
both

have

had

unhesitatingly

unblemished

prior

Both grievants are
Both make

no

Both concede the facts and

records.

Indeed

the

Company

characterizes them as otherwise good employees.

Therefore, with the Company's policy sustained and the
discharges upheld, I recommend that the Company give the girevants
a "last chance."

I recommend they be restored to duty

without

back pay, and assigned to driver and monitor work if and as it
becomes

available

in

areas and

at

school

districts

apart

different from Greensburgh District &7.1

1 They cannot be restored to Greenburgh under any circumstance
because that District has "decertified" them.
4

and

The Undersigned, Impartial Chairman under the collective
bargaining

agreement between the above-named parties, and having

duly heard the proofs and allegations of said parties, makes the
following AWARD:
There was just cause for the discharges of
CHARLENE PHILLIP and LUCILLE CARVER.

Eric J. Schmertz
Impartial Chairman

DATED:

June 24, 2002

STATE OF NEW YORK

)

COUNTY OF NEW YORK

)

ss:

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Impartial Chairman that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

IMPARTIAL CHAIRMAN LOCAL 100 TRANSPORT
WORKERS UNION AND WHITE PLAINS BUS CO. INC.
—

"V

IN THE MATTER OF THE ARBITRATION
between
OPINION AND AWARD
LOCAL 100, TRANSPORT WORKERS UNION
OF AMERICA

-andWHITE PLAINS BUS CO. INC.
-X

The stipulated issue is:
Was there just cause for the discharge of
MARIANITA MEDINA? If not, what shall be the
remedy?
A hearing was held on August 21, 2002, at the offices of
the Company at which time Ms. Medina and representatives of the
above-named Union and Company appeared.
All concerned were afforded full opportunity

to offer

evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
The Arbitrator's Oath was waived.
The facts in this case are sufficiently similar to those
of the prior cases of Charlene. Phillip, Lucille Carver,
Benedetto

and Etta Daniels

to

compel a

Frank

similar decision

and

similar recommendation.
Ms. Medina, hereinafter referred to as the "grievant"
admits that she failed to check her bus at the end of her morning

run on Friday, June 14, 2002 and consequently left a sleeping
child on the bus in the Company's parking lot.

The child,

unattended got off the bus, went into the dispatch office and was
there found and identified and delivered to his school.
With

that

admission

of

a manifest

violation

of

an

unequivocal and well-noticed Company rule that driver's must check
their buses for sleeping

children

and following having done so,

post at the rear of the bus a sign attending to that examination,
the burden shift to, the grievant and the Union on her behalf to
advance any circumstances which would mitigate the established
policy of the penalty of discharge for the offense.
The grievant has not met that burden.

She asserts that

she was ill, suffering from a headache and hence neglected to make
the required check of her bus.
job elsewhere

(housecleaning)

She admits that she has a second
following her morning run, but did

not go to it that day because she felt too ill.
The Company disputes her explanation.

It asserts that

upon her interview and during the grievance Hearing Deposition,
she never claimed that she was ill, but rather stated that she
left the bus hurriedly because she was late for her second job.
The aforesaid different versions are at least offsetting
and hence not probatively established by the grievant.

Indeed,

she claims that she worked a later run that day as well as Monday
and Tuesday

of the

following

week, before being

taken

out of

service on Tuesday.
The Company disputes this as well, asserting

that she

was taken out of service forthwith on Friday, June 14th, the day of
the violation.
Again, with the burden of explanation shifted to the
grievant,

the

claim

that

she

worked

subsequently

was

not

probatively established, and moreover that claim at least as to a
later run on Friday, is obviously inconsistent with her claim of
illness.

That she did not have a monitor

on her bus did not

relieve her of the duty to check for sleeping children.

So, that

explanation must be rejected.
Therefore

for

all

the

reasons

setforth

in my

prior

decisions, previously cited, and because of the enforceability of
the Company's unconditional rule and its fiduciary duty to the
children it transports in support of the propriety of that rule, I
have

no

choice

but

to

rule

in

this

case what

I have

ruled

previously - namely to uphold the grievant's discharge.
However

some

different

mitigating

circumstances,

comparable to those recited in the earlier cases, are present in
this case too.

The

grievant's

prior

work

record

is

not

seriously

blemished to disqualify her from a recommendation that she be reemployed, but at a different school district than White Plains
(where she has been

decertified).

Also,

significantly,

as in

prior matters, the grievant is remorseful and genuinely sorry for
her negligence,

I am satisfied that she was and remains mindful

and properly concerned about the dangers inherent in what happened
in

this

case,

diligently

and

follow

I

believe

the

that

prescribed

if

re-employed

rules

rigidly

she

and

will

without

exception.
Accordingly,

without

continued

enforceability

precedent

for

Company

any

consider,

of

future
in

its

prejudice
the

Company's

matters,
sole

to

it

the
rule,

validity
and

without

is recommended that

discretion,

to

and

re-employ

the
the

grievant without back pay in a school district in which she is not
decertified.
The Undersigned, Impartial Chairman under the collective
bargaining agreement between the above-named parties, and having

duly heard the proofs and allegations of said parties, makes the
following AWARD:
The discharge
just cause.

of MARIANITA MEDINA

was

for

Eri/5 J. Schmertz
Impartial Chairman

DATED:

September 3, 2002

STATE OF NEW YORK

)

COUNTY OF NEW YORK

}

ss:

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Impartial Chairman that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

IMPARTIAL CHAIRMAN LOCAL 100 TRANSPORT
WORKERS UNION AND WHITE PLAINS BUS CO. INC.
.

V

IN THE MATTER OF THE ARBITRATION
between
OPINION AND AWARD
LOCAL 100, TRANSPORT WORKERS UNION
OF AMERICA
-andWHITE PLAINS BUS CO. INC.
-X

There

are

two

issues

in

dispute.

The

above-named

parties stipulated the wording of the first issue, but could not
agree on a wording of the s.econd.
The first stipulated issue is:
Whether the Company violated the collective
bargaining agreement by unilaterally changing
pay hours posted for the UCP/YAI pick? If so
what shall be the remedy?
The second issue is the Union's grievance
that the Company violated the collective
bargaining
agreement
by
denying
UCP/YAI
drivers the opportunity to bid on mid-day
school bus runs.
A hearing was held on August 29, 2002, at the Marriott
Courtyard in Tarrytown, New York at which time representatives of
the

Union

and

Company

appeared

involved in the two grievances.

together

with

the

employees

The
disabled.

UCP/YAI

Wheel

runs

chairs

are confined
and

other

utilized by many of the passengers.
activities

sponsored

disabilities

by

to passengers who

mechanical

equipment

are
are

They are taken to and from

organizations

handling

(Cerebral Palsy and Young Adults

developmental

Institute).

For

obvious reasons, the buses have a compliment of monitors to assist
with the passengers.
The Company's contract to transport UCP/YAI passengers
began about three years ago.

The schedule of runs was posted by

the Company with start and finishing hours, both for morning runs
and afternoon runs.
rate

times

the

The drivers were paid the contractual hourly

number

of

posted

hours.

Depending

on

those

prescribed hours, the drivers were paid for a low of 30 hours to a
high of 40 hours.
Recently the Company re-assessed the hours accorded the
UCP/YAI runs, because it concluded, upon observations, that many
of

those

buses

were

returning

early,

having

assignments in less time than was allotted.
paid for the full-time allotment.

completed

their

But the drivers were

Consequently, the Company recently announced a reduction
of the allotted times, thereby reducing the hours for which the
drivers were to be paid.1
The effect of the new schedules would be to reduce the
paid hours of the drivers from a low of 28.75 to a high of 37.50.
By example, the Union points out that Route 9 was cut from 30 to
27.50 hours; Route 11 from 47.5 to 33.75 hours; and Route 7 from
36.25 to 28.75 hours.

And the pay of the drivers would be reduced

accordingly.
The Union

asserts

that

such

a unilateral

act by the

Company would be a breach of Section 32 of the contract which
reads:
Rights and Benefits
The
Employer
agrees
that
all
rights,
benefits, privileges and condition enjoyed by
their employees prior to the effective date
of this Agreement and not covered by this
Agreement, shall be extended throughout the
terms of this Agreement.
The Union contends that the originally posted hours were
and

are

a

"benefit,

and

right"

within

the

meaning

foregoing.

The parties have agreed that the new hours would not be
implemented pending the Award in this case.

1

of

the

The

Company

asserts

that

Section

32

is

inapplicable

because, as a change in hours subsequent to the effective date of
the

contract,

those

hours

do

not

qualify

as

"conditions

enjoyed. . .prior to the effective date of the Agreement

(emphasis

added).
The

Company's

principal

defense is

that

its

action,

based on an accurate re-assessment and calculation of the number
of hours required to complete the assignments, is a managerial
right

under

Section

29

of

the

contract.

Specifically,

the

Company's:
"...sole jurisdiction over the management and
operation
of
its
business..."
and
its
"...right to maintain efficiency..."
It points out that the new, reduced pay hours are for
the new regularly scheduled assignments, but if the drivers must
work additional time to complete those assignments
example,

traffic,

difficulties

loading

and

(because, for

unloading,

tardy

passengers etc.) they will be paid for the extra time.
In short, argues the Company, its contractual obligation
is to pay drivers only for time actually worked, and that the new
schedules meet that requirement.

With regard to issue #1, I conclude that neither Section
32 nor Section 29 are dispositive.

I do not conclude that the old

schedule of hours is a "benefit or right or privilege" that is
"not

covered by

integral,

the Agreement."

albeit implicit part

Rather, I find it to be
of

the hourly

pay

an

schedule of

Section 5 of the contract, and so known to both sides.
And for that reason, Section 29 (Management Rights) is
not applicable because the rights thereunder are not unrestricted
but rather "subject to the provisions of this Agreement."
I accept the Company's assertion that the Union asked
for a separate pick for the UCP/YAI) runs.

And that in making

that pick, a driver accepted a 52-week schedule as compared to a
40-week schedule for drivers of school buses.

But I do not find,

and the Company does not allege, that those negotiations for a
separate pick included any bilateral negotiation of a reduction in
the number

of posted hours

for the UCP/YAI

runs.

Indeed, I

conclude that though the Union sought a separate pick, it believed
and had reason to believe that the hourly rates of pay for bus
drivers under Section 5 would not only continue but would continue
to be applicable for the hours of the UCP/YAI runs as then posted.
Certainly it did not agree otherwise.

Had the Union then been told of a reassessment of the
time required for those runs and that reductions were contemplated
it would have been put on notice of the impact on wages.

As wage

rates are a mandatory subject of collective bargaining, the Union
would have had the lawful right to seek compensatory adjustment in
the hourly rate or to demand negotiations on that matter.
not to say that if such negotiations
entitled

to

an

upward

rate

This is

took place the Union was

adjustment

but

rather

it

was

contractually and lawfully entitled to seek it.

But, a unilateral

reduction

wage

in

the

scheduled

hours

when

the

rates

were

negotiated as applicable to the original hours posted, constitutes
at least a constructive change and/or diminution

in the wages of

the affected drivers and hence is violative of Section 5.
Put another way, I see a breach in the prescribed wage
rates and probably
mandatory

a breach of the a duty to negotiate

on the

subject of wages, when a unilateral change in posted

hours upon which those rates were expected contractually to apply,
caused a unilateral reduction in pay.
Accordingly, the Company is enjoined from installing the
new

hourly

schedule

for

UCP/YAI

drivers,

and

is

directed

to

restore

the

original posted hourly

schedule.

Of

course,

the

parties are always free to negotiate changes bilaterally.
As to the 2nd grievance, despite the negotiation of a
separate pick for UCP/YAI runs or assignments, I do not find that
those negotiations included any bilateral agreement to bar UCP/YAI
drivers from exercising their seniority to bid on mid-day school
bus runs.
I

find

that Section

amended or waived.

17B of the contract was

neither

That Section in pertinent part reads:

"All runs and extra work shall be assigned
based upon relative seniority, subject to
availability" (emphasis added).
The

foregoing

contract

between school bus runs,

language

other runs

makes

no

distinction

and/or UCP/YAI runs.

The

"work" of the Company encompasses them all and the reference to
"all runs" in 17B is unconditionally
There

is

no

argument

qualified to drive school buses.

inclusive.

that

UCP/YAI

drivers

are

not

There is no question that they

have the available time in mid-day, after or between UCP/YAI runs
or that, except
otherwise

for their

ineligible.

And,

separate pick arrangement,
as

stated,

they are

I find nothing

in the

agreement to set up a separate pick (other than the 52-week vs. 40

work

schedule)

seniority rights
mid-day

school

that

precludes

the

exercise-

to bid for mid-day school runs.
bus

work

is

a

"run,"

"pick"

or

of

their

Whether the
"assignment,"

Section 17B is fully applicable and controlling.
Accordingly, the Company may not bar the UCP/YAI drivers
from exercising their seniority for selection on mid-day school
DUS runs.
The Undersigned, Impartial Chairman under the collective
bargaining agreement between the above-named parties, and having
duly heard the proofs and allegations of said parties, makes the
following AWARD:
1. The Company would violate the collective
bargaining agreement by changing the pay
hours of the UCP/YAI pick.
The Company is directed to retain the hours
as originally posted, unless there is
bilateral agreement otherwise.

2. The Company is in violation of or would
violate the collective bargaining agreement
by barring UCP/YAI drivers from exercising
their seniority to be assigned to mid-day
school bus runs.

Eric J. Schmertz
Impartial Chairman

DATED:

September 17, 2002

STATE OF NEW YORK

)
ss:

COUNTY OF NEW YORK

)

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Impartial Chairman that I am the individual described in and who
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